In Defense of Bottoms-Up
Bottoms-Up RCV makes the most sense for DC under the current DC Charter
Brian Strege, Chair, Grow Democracy DC
Monday, November 2, 2026
TABLE OF CONTENTS
- INTRODUCTION
- SECTION 1. Our non-majority-party seats
- SECTION 2. What was wrong with “pick two?”
- SECTION 3. What are the options for multi-winner RCV tabulation?
- SECTION 4. Why is Bottoms-Up right for DC?
- SECTION 5. What the DC Council should consider
- SECTION 6. About that Washington Socialist article…
- CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
Tomorrow, DC will undertake its first general election using the ranked choice voting (RCV) structure established by Initiative 83. Though RCV was used in this year’s primary, there has been much discussion – and some confusion – about how RCV will work in the race to elect two At-Large members of the DC Council.
That confusion is understandable. Unlike every other contest on the ballot that involves RCV, the At-Large race is not a single-winner contest. Rather, it is a single contest that produces two winners at once. Though single-winner RCV always functions the same way, there are a few different forms of multi-winner RCV. The three main methods are Bottoms-Up, Single Transferable Vote (STV), and Sequential/Multi-Pass.
The drafters of Initiative 83 considered and debated all three options and ultimately concluded that, as outlined below, due to the unique structure of the DC Council and certain restrictions laid out in our Charter, Bottoms-Up RCV is the fairest tabulation method for the District.
I was a steering committee member of Initiative 83 and joined the effort just after the drafters decided on Bottoms-Up. None of the systems are perfect. Each has its benefits and drawbacks. But I believed then and still believe now that the correct choice was made: Bottoms-Up fits DC’s unique Council structure best. So long as our current Charter stands, so should Bottoms-Up RCV.
Having said that, I do hope to spark a broader conversation, rather than just offering my answer to the question “which multi-winner RCV system is best.” There are reforms that the DC Council could consider that would have been impossible via initiative. If Council really wants to open this can of worms in the new year, I hope they’ll weigh some options other than a simple multi-winner RCV swap.
SECTION 1. Our non-majority-party seats
First, let me point out one critical fact: the two At-Large seats that we are simultaneously electing are not equivalent seats. The DC Home Rule Charter – the closest thing we’ve got to a state constitution – specifically reserves one of these two seats (per cycle) for a non-majority party member. Functionally, that means a non-Democrat.
It accomplishes this in two ways: 1) by limiting the number of candidates that can advance from each party primary – only one registered Democrat will ever be on your general election ballot, not two; and 2) by limiting the number of candidates from a single party that can serve at any given time, to discourage after-the-fact party switching:
DC Code § 1–204.01(b)(2)
In the case of the first election held for the office of member of the Council after January 2, 1975, not more than 2 of the at-large members (excluding the Chairman) shall be nominated by the same political party. Thereafter, a political party may nominate a number of candidates for the office of at-large member of the Council equal to 1 less than the total number of at-large members (excluding the Chairman) to be elected in such election. [emphasis added]
DC Code § 1–204.01(d)(3)
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at no time shall there be more than 3 members (including the Chairman) serving at large on the Council who are affiliated with the same political party. [emphasis added]
Since gaining Home Rule, DC has been a city dominated by the Democratic Party. All of our Ward-level Council seats have always been filled by Democrats, and – save for a brief one-year period after David Catania’s 1997 special election win – the three out of five At-Large Council seats available to Democrats have also always been filled by Democrats.
For the first few decades of Home Rule, those two non-Democratic seats – I’ll refer to them as the “non-Dem” seats for short – tended to be filled by candidates from other parties. We had Councilmembers from the DC Statehood/DC Statehood Green Party, as well as a few moderate Republicans. Whatever the merits of this reserved-non-Dem-seat setup – and I’ll have more to say on that later – it did seem to be creating some ideological diversity (albeit forced) on the DC Council.
Sometime in the 2000s, this started to change. Instead of party candidates getting elected to these non-Dem seats, former Democrats simply ran for these seats as independents. From 2009 onward, both non-Dem seats have always been filled by independents. And with one exception, all of those independents were former Democrats who switched their party affiliations right before they ran for the seat; in one case, a Councilmember who had previously served on the Council as a Democrat switched his party registration to independent to run for an At-Large seat.
The trend is clear: the non-Dem seats are increasingly being held by politicians who readily switch between the parties, calling into question whether we are following the letter, but not the spirit, of the law. The old system worked fine, so long as Democrats respected the norm of actually running for the non-reserved seats. Once they abandoned that norm, the “pick two” system became a weapon to implicitly undermine the Charter.
SECTION 2. What was wrong with “pick two?”
The previous system we used in our general elections to elect the At-Large members was referred to around DC colloquially as the “pick two” system, but it’s actually something called plurality block voting. A voter is presented with a single column of choices, and can fill in up to as many bubbles as there are seats being filled. In DC, that meant you could select up to two candidates.
While this feels fair, in practice, plurality block voting functionally undermines the existence of the non-Dem seats defined in the Charter which were set up to ensure some measure of minority representation in a District dominated by single party politics. It does so by giving Democratic voters a say on both seats while effectively forcing non-Dem voters to split their voting power in half between two candidates.
Simply put: the old system worked just fine for voters who liked the Democratic candidate. They are free to cast one of their votes for the Democrat, and then they get a bonus vote to weigh in on the non-Dem seat. The Democratic bloc essentially gets to pick both seats.
Meanwhile, for voters who do not want to vote for the Democrat, they are (practically speaking) casting their “pick two” votes for candidates who are running against each other for the one remaining non-Dem seat. That leaves these non-Dem voters with two dissatisfactory choices: 1) vote for two non-Dems, casting votes that may cancel each other out as both of those candidates vie for the same seat; or 2) throw away one of their “two votes” to avoid having their most-preferred candidate defeated by their own second vote.
NOTE: On the topic of non-Dem votes canceling each other out in our At-Large race, there is actually a non-RCV system called cumulative voting which would at least ameliorate this problem by allowing a voter to cast their two votes for the same candidate. That system – unlike plurality block voting – truly gives the voter “two votes,” and would allow a political minority group to pool their votes onto a single candidate to at least have a better chance to gain one of the available seats.
Clones
The term “clone” is sometimes used in political science literature to describe candidates that are substantially similar (in policy, or otherwise) on the ballot. It’s a useful concept in order to analyze different voting methods. For example, you’ve probably heard that RCV helps mitigate the “spoiler effect,” i.e. it prevents similar candidates from splitting the vote and allowing a less-favored candidate to win without majority support. A more technical way of saying this is that (single-winner) RCV is “clone independent.”
Plurality block voting, on the other hand, is a clone-electing machine. It is a hypermajoritarian system, and a slate of clones can win every available seat.
One of our neighboring states, Maryland, is a good example of how this works in practice. The Maryland House of Delegates consists of 141 members, 111 of which come from multi-member districts (some two-member, some three). In those multi-member districts, Maryland uses plurality block voting to elect their members – their own “pick two” and “pick three” systems.
While Maryland is also a very blue (i.e. Democratic) jurisdiction, it does have some Republican pockets such as the western panhandle and the eastern shore. There are also some relatively “purple” places as well, so you might expect that out of Maryland’s 111 seats from multi-member districts, there might be at least a couple of those districts that sent Delegates from both parties to Maryland’s House.
Well, you’d be wrong. Currently, in all 111 seats from multi-member districts, it’s either a full slate of (R)s or a full slate of (D)s. Not a single one split their delegation, even in relatively politically-split districts. (In fact, over the past two decades, Maryland has only ever elected non-party-slate candidates in any of its multi-member districts about 6% of the time.)
This is simply what plurality block voting does: it elects slates of like-minded candidates. It elects clones. And using that system to elect a Dem simultaneously with a candidate for the reserved non-Dem seat – when that reserved seat is intended to foster some ideological diversity on the DC Council – was always a deeply flawed way of doing things.
SECTION 3. What are the options for multi-winner RCV tabulation?
Alright, back to ranked choice voting. For single-winner races, there is only one method of RCV tabulation: you remove the lowest-performing candidate and redistribute their voters' choices to their later-ranked candidates until a single candidate crosses the 50% minimum threshold for victory. This produces a winner who has majority support.
For single-winner RCV, there is only one goal: get a majority. For multi-winner, it isn't that simple, because it is mathematically impossible for two or more candidates to simultaneously have a majority. There are essentially three main options for multi-winner RCV tabulation: Bottoms-Up, Single Transferable Vote (STV), or Sequential (sometimes called Multi-Pass). Those systems are explained below, but first, I want to describe some of the democratic theory behind each system.
Because different tabulations can produce different outcomes, it’s necessary to consider – before specific candidates are named – what are the values the system is trying to achieve? Whose voices is the system designed to hear? There is a spectrum of options, but they boil down to two poles: proportional and majoritarian.
- Proportional: Proportional systems seek to elect multiple candidates that fairly represent the overall electorate, and to allow for political minority groups to gain at least some representation. Once you as a voter have successfully elected one winning candidate, your voting power is diminished – at least somewhat – for the other seats so that other voters can have a say.
- Majoritarian: Majoritarian systems seek to elect multiple candidates that are all supported by the dominant party, even if that means that minority parties – even sizable minorities – end up with little or no representation. Once you as a voter have successfully elected one winning candidate, you go on to have an equal say in selecting the next winning candidate, effectively allowing a majority faction to control every single seat.
Below, I'll briefly explain all three of these systems, each of which lands somewhere along this spectrum of small-d democratic values. I'll also show a real-world example of how these systems would work in practice.
Single Transferable Vote (STV)
STV tabulation is the most complex to describe, so we'll start with this one. Essentially, there would be a new “win threshold” defined for our two-seat race. Unlike with single-winner, where you need to exceed 50% to win, under two-winner STV you need to exceed 33.333% to win one of the available seats. This value is called the “Droop quota.” It’s the point at which you can’t “fit” two winners above that candidate; if someone is sitting at 34% of the vote, there can’t be two candidates beating them with 35% each, as that would add up to over 100%. Once you hit 33.333%, you’re mathematically safe from elimination.
Any votes for the first winner – in DC, likely the Democrat – above and beyond 33.333% are considered “wasted votes,” and that surplus amount gets transferred to those voters’ next choices. This is where the fractional votes come into play. Let’s say that 100 votes were cast, and the Democrat received 51 in the first round. The Democrat only needed 34 of those 51 votes to exceed the Droop quota (33.333%), so 17 of those votes were surplus votes. But which 17 votes out of those 51 votes cast will have their second choices come into play?
We can’t just select 17 out of the 51 votes at random to be the ones to have their second choices counted. Instead, modern implementations of STV allow a fractional portion of all of those votes to carry forward to their second choices. In this example, for the 51 voters that ranked the Democrat first, they really only needed to use 34/51 (two-thirds) of each of their votes to get the Democrat over the line to the winning threshold. That means that they each will have the remaining one-third of each of their votes carrying forward and counting towards their later rankings. Their voting power for their second ranking (and beyond) has been diminished from one full vote to one-third of a vote.
STV is designed to produce proportional representation – one end of the values spectrum.
Sequential/Multi-Pass
Sequential RCV is essentially doing a single-winner RCV contest multiple times, deleting each winner and restarting the tabulations to determine the winner of the next seat. For our two-seat setup, Sequential would work like this: run a single-winner RCV contest, and find the winner. Then, delete any selections of that winner from all of the votes (i.e. from each voter's set of rankings), and run single-winner RCV again to find the second winner. Since there are multiple passes through the same set of votes – there would be a Round 1 for the first seat, and a Round 1 for the second seat – it’s sometimes called “Multi-Pass.”
Sequential is designed to produce majoritarian representation – the other end of the values spectrum.
Bottoms-Up
This is objectively the easiest system to understand. Whereas a single-winner RCV contest eliminates the poorest-performing candidate one round at a time until a candidate reaches 50% of the vote, Bottoms-Up simply does the exact same thing until there are two candidates remaining. That’s it. The only difference from single-winner is in the “stop condition” – single-winner runs candidate eliminations until someone gets over 50%, and (two-winner) Bottoms-Up runs candidate eliminations until two candidates are left.
Bottoms-Up is considered a “semi-proportional” system, and on that values spectrum it can be considered to be somewhere between STV and Sequential.
Tabulations in action – the Ward 1 Dem primary
We have some real-world RCV data from DC, where we can actually “test” who would have won under these various two-winner tabulation systems. The general election hasn’t happened yet, but we do have the full set of data from DC’s Democratic primary back in June. If we imagine that one of those contests was actually a two-winner race, we can see how these different systems work in practice.
The selection of one two-winner RCV mechanism over another will only change who claims that second seat if the second and third place candidates are relatively close together. With that in mind, let’s analyze the contest from the June primary that had the closest percentage gap between second and third place: the Ward 1 race.
Aparna Raj, Rashida Brown, Jackie Reyes Yanes, Terry Lynch, and Miguel Trindade Deramo competed against one another in a five-way race for the Democratic nomination for Ward 1 Councilmember. There was also a relatively insignificant number of write-in votes.

In Round 4 of the RCV tabulations, Raj was declared the winner with 9,729 votes. But now imagine – that rather than this being a single-winner contest – this had been a two-winner contest. Who would claim that second seat?
You might be tempted to look at the results above, and say that Trindade Deramo would claim the second seat. And with Bottoms-Up RCV, we already know that that’s correct! Bottoms-Up would simply run one additional elimination round. Since Brown is in third (last) place, she would be eliminated, and the two remaining candidates would be Raj and Trindade Deramo. In this scenario, as can be seen above, Trindade Deramo’s margin of victory over Brown (for the second seat) would have been 1,061 votes.
But what about with the other two tabulation mechanisms? Who gets the second seat then? Well, with both of those systems, Raj’s voters’ later-ranked candidates will come into play. Under STV, some fractional amount of those votes will carry through. And under Sequential, Raj’s voters get an entire second vote.
Of those 9,729 Raj voters, 4,307 of them had a preference for Brown over Trindade Deramo, and 2,894 of them had a preference for Trindade Deramo over Brown. 2,528 of them did not express a preference. (These numbers can be calculated via the released CVR data.) That means that Raj’s voters preferred Brown over Trindade Deramo by about a 60 / 40 margin.
If this hypothetical two-winner race were conducted via STV, Trindade Deramo still picks up that second seat, but his margin is narrowed somewhat. He beats Brown for the second seat by 590.2543 votes (remember, STV uses fractional votes).
On the other hand, if this hypothetical two-winner race were conducted via Sequential, Brown picks up the second seat. She beats Trindade Deramo for the second seat by 352 votes.
What explains the differences here? Well, with Sequential, Raj’s voters essentially get to vote twice – and their 60 / 40 preference for Brown over Trindade Deramo pushes the race towards Brown enough for her to win. With STV, Raj’s voters do have a slight effect on the race for the second seat (also pushing it towards Brown), but the impact is much more muted.
The “gap” in the winning margin between STV and Bottoms-Up in this scenario was about 471 votes. Between STV and Sequential, it was about 942 votes – twice as large. For what it's worth, I also ran this same test on both of our At-Large races from the primary (Dem primary and special election), and in both cases STV produced results closer to Bottoms-Up than to Sequential.
SECTION 4. Why is Bottoms-Up right for DC?
Bottoms-Up is right for DC because it is easy to understand and most faithful to the DC Charter. The drafters of Initiative 83 only arrived at Bottoms-Up only after considering all three above systems – and including, importantly, public sentiment from prior RCV debates.
Why not STV?
There are plenty of advocates for STV out there, and those who like STV really like STV. It is used in a fair number of small-to-medium-sized cities across the US. But even the most ardent STV supporter will tell you that a two-member district is not its ideal use case anyway; you see greater benefits from its proportionality in three-or-four-member districts (or more).
Number of seats aside, there are two main reasons that STV is not a good fit for DC: 1) voter confusion; and 2) the DC Charter’s reservation of non-Dem seats.
Confusion: Before Initiative 83, there was the Voting Ownership, Integrity, Choice, and Equality (VOICE) Act, which also sought to implement RCV, but chose STV as the two-winner tabulation method. In the telling of those who remembered the VOICE Act effort, it was constantly dogged by public confusion over the fractional vote transfer mechanism. DC voters simply did not understand the system, and when voters can’t understand it, they don’t trust it.
Bottom line: The voters and the DC Council already considered – and rejected – STV.
DC Charter: While STV is used in several cities across the US, none of them have a structure quite like DC’s. Everywhere that STV is used, it fills multi-member districts where the seats are fundamentally equal and interchangeable. Our election, however, is not filling equal seats: one is explicitly reserved as a non-Dem seat, and the other is not. This makes pure proportionality an ill-fitting goal for a multi-winner system in DC. We’re filling a seat that’s explicitly reserved for non-Dems; there is no reason to allow a fractional portion of a Democratic vote to filter through into the selection of the non-Dem seat. Given the overwhelming dominance of the Democratic party, this could effectively allow them to continue to control who gets elected to the non-Dem seat.
Bottom line: Because of the reserved non-Dem seats defined within the DC Charter, STV is not a good fit here; these seats are not equal, and STV could inadvertently enable more majoritarian effects within the reserved seats than the Charter intends.
Why not Sequential?
This is the method that DC Council briefly flirted with passing as emergency legislation earlier this year. This form of multi-winner tabulation is roundly despised in the RCV community; it’s seen as a fundamentally unfair system.
Like STV, it is also a bad fit for DC specifically, and for the same reason: the DC Charter’s reservation of non-Dem seats.
DC Charter: At the risk of sounding like a broken record, the Charter is meant to guarantee minority representation and prevent the dominant party from controlling every seat. Sequential RCV is majoritarian: If we’re assuming that the Democratic candidate will come in first place, all of their voters will be given an extra shot to weigh in on the second seat. Everyone else, on the other hand, will have their votes remain as they were for the first seat. This would be far worse than STV, because instead of the Democratic party exerting control over the non-Dem seat with leftover fractions of their votes, they would each get a full additional vote in the second pass.
Bottom line: With Sequential RCV, Democrats get to vote twice, but nobody else does. At least, that’s how it would function for all intents and purposes here in DC.
Why Bottoms-Up?
When crafting Initiative 83, the drafters were faced with a choice: a) choose a confusing, already-rejected system that undermines the DC Charter; b) choose a fundamentally unfair system that also undermines the Charter; or c) choose a compromise tabulation method that best honors the goals of the DC Charter.
Simple to understand: Unlike STV and the VOICE Act, Bottoms-Up is an easy-to-understand two-winner tabulation system. Its simplicity was one of the reasons it was chosen. Voters do not have to contend with complicated fractional votes, surplus transfers, etc.
Some may argue that most Initiative 83 voters were not keyed in on the tabulation debate when voting. And that is true. But that is not the same as saying that the system was chosen in error or in secret. Indeed, this issue was publicly debated during Initiative 83. I can also personally attest to this; the concept of “fractional votes” came up quite a bit while campaigning for I-83. Opponents tried to persuade voters by reviving the VOICE Act debate, pointing towards other jurisdictions that use STV, and describing fractional votes as unnecessarily confusing. We responded that Initiative 83 had purposefully rejected STV in favor of Bottoms-Up, a system that does not utilize fractional votes.
Bottom line: Voter feedback from the VOICE Act was baked into the deliberate choice of Bottoms-Up as the two-winner tabulation method for Initiative 83.
DC Charter: Let's be honest, this is what has many Democrats belatedly up-in-arms about Bottoms-Up RCV: it restores the spirit of the DC Charter that party politics have successfully undermined in recent decades. But it is a feature of the system, not a bug.
If a voter ranks the Democrat #1 on their ballot, their later rankings are highly unlikely to ever come into play. This is DC – the Democrat is almost certainly going to come in first place, and therefore they aren’t going to get eliminated. What this essentially means is that the second seat in our At-Large race is going to be selected by the voters who did not rank the Democrat first. That second winning candidate will be the consensus pick of non-Dem voters in that cycle, which is not only wholly appropriate for, but the entire point of the non-Dem seat.
Bottom line: Bottoms-Up is faithful to the DC Charter’s reserved-seat structure, more so than “pick-two” ever was.
SECTION 5. What the DC Council should consider
The central question at the center of this debate is simple: do we believe in upholding the spirit of the DC Charter’s goal of preventing any one dominant party from shutting out minority representation via these reserved seats, or not?
If the answer is yes, then Bottoms-Up is the only RCV system that makes sense for the two-winner At-Large DC Council election.
If the answer is no, then maybe we should just admit that people aren’t really confused by the tabulation process, they are just results-oriented partisans unhappy that the dominant party no longer gets to control the non-Dem seat. And if that's the case, the DC Council should begin the process of amending these reserved seats out of the Charter.
Structural change option #1: Eliminate the non-Dem seat requirement
If Bottoms-Up RCV’s restoration of the spirit of the DC Charter is so untenable, then the problem isn’t RCV, it’s the Charter. If so, we should all just collectively admit that we’re not all that dedicated to having these non-Dem seats in the first place. Watching DC politicos fall over themselves on every issue under the sun, claiming that their position is the one that “respects Home Rule,” is extremely tiresome knowing that we have this one provision in the Charter that nobody seems to care about skirting.
I’ve spoken to many elected Democrats in DC about this and the consensus seems to be: the reserved seats are a joke. One called it a “stupid rule.” Another called it a “farce.”
And to be fair, recent election events have proved the farcical nature of the seats. In 2022, Kenyan McDuffie ran for Attorney General while serving as a Democrat on the Council; when he was ruled ineligible for the AG seat, he switched his party registration to independent mid-election cycle to run for and win one of the non-Dem seats. This year, in order to run for the Democratic mayoral nomination, he switched his party registration back to Democrat. That switcheroo had earlier prompted chatter about retiring Councilmember Anita Bonds possibly swapping party registration with McDuffie so that he would not have to resign from the Council for his Mayoral run. And with Councilmember R. White resigning today, similar rumors have surfaced.
The process involved to temporarily fill the vacancy caused by McDuffie’s resignation in 2026 is also instructive. Since McDuffie was an independent when he resigned, the job of filling that vacancy fell to the Council, per the Charter’s language that “the Council shall appoint a similarly non-affiliated person.” But did the Council try to find someone with actual independent bona fides to fill that seat? Absolutely not. Their selection process did not take this into consideration whatsoever, and the list of potential candidates was a who’s who of Democratic staffers and former Democratic primary candidates. For the supposed non-Dem seat.
If our partisan elected officials believe that their party should be able to control all the seats on Council, then they should put that to a vote. We can determine if that’s what the voters want. The reserved-seat provisions are contained within an amendable part of the Charter. Yes, it would be subject to Congressional approval, but so are all of our laws.
The DC Council could start the process of amending the Charter to remove these non-Dem seats next year. As part of the Charter amendment process, the question of removing these seats would be put to the voters: we could all vote on this question in 2028. This is the appropriate remedy. Put the question to the voters. Let’s all collectively decide if we feel that there’s a benefit to these reserved seats, or not.
There would still be the question of which two-winner RCV tabulation mechanism to use for our At-Large seats once the non-Dem seats were removed. I personally would have far less of an issue switching to STV at this point, since the seats would now be interchangeable. However, I have a hunch that many people’s complaints about Bottoms-Up would suddenly evaporate once two Democrats were allowed to advance from the primary to the general election.
Structural change option #2: Scrap two-winner elections by splitting the races
If removing the non-Dem seats via Charter amendment is a bridge too far, another option that the Council could consider is this: just split the At-Large race into two separate races. If you really want two votes, have two contests.
Instead of having a single RCV contest on our general election ballots to simultaneously fill our two At-Large seats, we’d have two contests. So, two entirely separate RCV ballot grids. One of them would be called “At-Large Member of the Council,” and the other would be “At-Large Member of the Council (Non-Majority Party).” Practically speaking, this would draw all of the real competition to that second race; since the first race would be filled by a Democrat chosen in the party primary.
You might ask whether Initiative 83 considered doing this. Splitting the races in this way is not a particularly good idea – for reasons I’ll get into below – but it’s an open question whether or not this would require a Charter amendment. From § 1–204.01(b)(2) which is cited earlier in this article, the exact language used is “at-large members […] to be elected in such election.”
The fact that “such election” is singular seems to imply that there needs to be a single contest that simultaneously elects the two members. But, it’s also possible that it’s just referring to a single election cycle, in which case splitting the races would be allowable. Either way, no initiative campaign worth its salt was going to try to propose something that might later be struck down as violating the Charter. The Council can further research this question of whether the Charter allows for splitting the races, if they decide to go down this road.
Having said all that, I don’t believe this is a very good option. Functionally, this would actually create a system that behaves fairly similarly to Sequential RCV. We’d lose all benefits of proportionality, and we’d just be using a majoritarian electoral system stacked on top of an already-majoritarian At-Large seat.
Also, in this scenario we’d be retaining the non-Dem seats, but doing absolutely nothing to make them less of a joke. Democrats would continue to run for the reserved seats by switching their party registration five seconds beforehand, and the Democratic electorate would get a freebie in the first seat while continuing to assert control over the second.
If the Council does decide to go down this path, they should at least pair it with some sort of continuous-party-registration requirement – sort of like a residency requirement – to prevent last-second party switching before running for the non-Dem seat. Or, at the very least, a requirement that someone who ran or served in the same cycle as a Democrat (say, for a Ward-level seat) couldn’t then turn around and run for the At-Large seat as an independent in the same year.
SECTION 6. About that Washington Socialist article…
Before I wrap up, I want to address an article published in the Washington Socialist earlier this year called “Locked Votes” that specifically attacked Initiative 83’s selection of Bottoms-Up tabulation for our two-winner RCV contest, and advocated for a switch to STV. I did not intend this article to be a direct rebuttal of that one, though I know it did cause a fair bit of discussion earlier in the year. I want to address just a few claims in the “Locked Votes” piece that I think are questionable, incomplete, or incorrect.
Claim: “Democratic voters, including most union households, lose their power to choose who fills that [second At-Large] seat. Effectively, 75% of voters (the Democrats) are allocated 50% of the At-Large seats, while the 25% non-Democratic voters that cover a range of different political beliefs are also allocated 50% of the At-Large seats. This is extremely anti-democratic (with a small d), essentially giving Democrats fewer real votes than their non-Democratic neighbors.”
The article is trying to make a proportionality argument here; that since only 25% of the voters are (registered) non-Democratic, they shouldn’t be allocated 50% of the seats. To be blunt, I don’t think that proportionality is the road the authors of this article want to go down here.
If proportionality is the goal, then remember: the At-Large seats subject to this tabulation mechanism are only four of our Councilmembers, and they don’t exist in a vacuum. We have 13 Councilmembers, and the Democratic nominee has never failed to win a general election in the history of Home Rule. With that in mind, having only two out of 13 seats – just over 15% – reserved for non-Democrats is actually too few, given that 25% of our electorate are non-Democrats. By this logic, if anything, we should be adding reserved seats, not making it easier for Democrats to control the two that we already have.
Claim: “To restore voters’ power to fully influence the outcome of the At-Large elections, DC will need to either revert back to the previous voting system for the At-Large elections or switch to the multi-seat forms of RCV used nearly everywhere else: single transferable vote. Single transferable vote is used in city elections in Cambridge, Massachusetts; Eastpointe, Michigan; Palm Desert, California; Albany, New York; Minneapolis, Minnesota; St. Paul, Minnesota; St. Louis Park, Minnesota; Portland, Oregon; and Portland, Maine.”
The article tries to establish STV as a sort of “best practices” for multi-winner RCV – by citing a bunch of jurisdictions that use it – in an attempt to paint Bottoms-Up tabulation as an outlier, and to encourage the DC Council to move away from it. While it’s true that several small-to-medium-sized cities across the US do use STV, none of them share our unique Dem/non-Dem Council structure of reserving a seat for the non-majority party and electing into that seat simultaneously with the other seat.
In fact, of all of the jurisdictions explicitly cited by the article above, of the ones that still use RCV – two have since dropped it – every single one of them conducts a nonpartisan election. There are no partisan primaries. This is an apples-to-oranges comparison. (This is assuming that the authors actually meant to cite Albany, California – Albany, New York does not use RCV.)
I also find it somewhat misleading-by-omission that the authors of this article never bother to discuss the complexity of STV. The piece never mentioned fractional votes, nor does it mention that STV was already discussed and rejected by members of the public during the VOICE Act as being too confusing. Indeed, the authors of the piece don’t even seem to fully understand STV: they cite an incorrect threshold for when surplus votes would be transferred under STV.
Claim: “Now, the roughly 25,000 reliable Republican voters — plus another 25,000 or so conservative independents and a bloc of moderate independents that lean anti-labor on economic issues — can form a winning coalition for a right-leaning candidate.”
To use an overused phrase, I’d say this is the quiet part out loud: the election of a “right-leaning candidate” is presented by this article as the doomsday scenario that must be stopped at all costs. While I take issue with the numbers here – the I-83 team had access to polling data indicating that “conservative independents” amounted to only 1% of the electorate, or more like 5,000 voters – my bigger problem with this is that the authors have a so obviously outcomes-focused view of electoral reform. There used to be a thumb on the scale for their side, and they're upset that the thumb has been removed.
If the non-Democratic voters of the city collectively choose to elect a right-leaning candidate into the non-Democratic seat, then that candidate should win. If you disagree with that, you disagree with democracy.
Claim: “Under the new election system, the race for the second At-Large seat becomes a fight over the non-Democratic vote only”
Yes, exactly. It’s the non-Democratic seat.
CONCLUSION
Bottoms-Up RCV tabulation was a purposely-selected component of Initiative 83, and fits our Dem/non-Dem Council seat structure significantly better than the old “pick two” system ever did. In fact, that system was not a good fit for our structure, has proven very easy to manipulate, and it should not be brought back from the dead.
Under Bottoms-Up, the specifically-reserved non-Democratic At-Large seat will be selected by those voters in a given election cycle who chose not to rank the Democrat first; essentially, the non-Democratic electorate of that cycle. The system matches the structure.
Whether or not you agree with the analysis in this article most likely hinges on whether or not you think that these non-Democratic seats should exist in the first place. I do not think the intent of the reserved seats in our Charter was simply to make Democratic politicians in DC play a game of partisan-registration musical chairs to decide who has to sit in the disfavored seat; that serves nobody’s interest, and makes our Council look exceedingly amateurish.
If the DC Council chooses to further examine the two-winner RCV tabulation system in the new year, they should ask themselves if what they’re really concerned about is that Democrats can no longer control the non-Democratic seats. If that’s the case, the better remedy is to propose a Charter amendment to remove those seats. But until then, don’t attack Initiative 83 for instituting a system that actually fills these seats in an honest way that honors the current language of the Charter.